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"CONTRACT THINKING" WAS MARVIN'S
FATAL FLAW
Ira Mark Ellman*
Marvin v. Marvin' held that claims that unmarried partners
might have against on6 another at the conclusion of their relationship
would be governed primarily by principles of contract law.2 That is,
they would have such obligations to one another as they had previ-
ously agreed they would have, no more and no less.3 When Marvin
was decided in 1976, it was greeted by most commentators as a just
development, as well as a liberating one.4 It ivas seen as just in com-
parison to the alternative of allowing no financial claims at all between
unmarried cohabitants whose relationship had ended (an alternative
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University; Visiting Professor of Law, Hastings
College of the Law, University of California.
1 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
2 See i& at 122.
3 This is a bit of an oversimplification. The court also permitted reliance upon
the contract-allied doctrine of quantum meruit, as well as the equitable doctrine of
constructive trust. See id. at 116-22. Neither in fact adds much, however. Quantum
meruit is of very limited utility, as commentators soon pointed out. &egenrally Gmce
G. Blumberg, Cohabitation Wi7thout Afarfiag" A Different Perspeciie, 28 UCLA L REv.
1125, 1165-66 (1981); Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enridjment: From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 Micr. L REv. 47, 51-54 (1978). The doctrine of
constructive or resulting trust in fact creates no new claims, but is simply the name
given to one remedy that is available to a plaintiff'who shows that the defendant holds
legal title to property that is properly treated as the plaintiff's. The important hurdle,
of course, is the initial showing of entitlement to the property to which another holds
title, and the court's mention of the constructive trust remedy does not itself provide
any basis upon which a cohabitant could make the showing that entitles one to it.
Footnote twenty-five of the Marvin case seemed to invite the development of new
equitable remedies, but that potential was cut short on the Martin remand itself. See
Marvin, 557 P.2d at 123 n.25. The trialjudge to whom the Marvin case was remanded
attempted to fashion such a remedy for Michelle Marvin, after finding she had no
claim in contract, but was reversed. Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558-59 (Ct.
App. 1981). The appeals court noted that the trial court's attempted award, being
"nonconsensual in nature," required support from "some recognized underlying obli-
gation in law or in equity" Id. at 559. But there was no such obligation.
4 See, e.g., Herma H. Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Optionm
65 CAL. L. REv. 937, 968-77 (1977).
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chosen three years later by the Illinois Supreme Court,). Writers con-
cerned with the impact of unmarried cohabitation on women were,
perhaps, thus particularly pleased, apparently assuming that Marvin
would protect these women from the financial penalty they might oth-
erwise suffer when their higher-earning male partners chose to leave.'
Marvin was also seen as liberating, however, in comparison to a differ-
ent alternative holding considered but rejected by the California Su-
preme Court, that of assimilating unmarried cohabitants into the legal
regime of marriage. 7 This alternative was later chosen by the Wash-
ington Supreme Court8 and more recently by the American Law Insti-
tute.9 California's choice of a contract remedy was seen as giving
options to partners in intimate relationships, options that would allow
each couple to ensure that the law took proper account of the way
they had chosen to fashion their particular relationship. 10 Other writ-
ers, perhaps inspired by this development, urged that marriage itself
be reconceptualized in contract terms, so that all intimate partners,
notjust those who declined to marry, could benefit from the diversity
in formal relationships that contract would make possible."l One
widely-noted book offered a variety of contractual forms to facilitate
the choices.' 2 While contracts scholars were writing (prematurely, as
it turned out) about the field's decline as a separate source of obliga-
5 See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (II. 1979) (holding that a financial
claim was barred by public policy implicit in the statutory scheme).
6 The Marvin doctrine was initially urged in part on that basis by Professor Carol
Bruch, whose writing was influential with the court. See Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights
of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q.
101, 125-26, 134-36 (1976).
7 See Marvin, 557 P.2d at 120.
8 Washington's assimilation of cohabitants into the legal regime of marriage ap-
plies only to the community property system, not to claims for post-relationship sup-
port. Recent applications of the Washington rule include In re Marriage of Lindemann,
960 P.2d 966 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), and Koher v. Morgan, 968 P.2d 920 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1998). The rule was developed by the Washington Supreme Court in the cases
of In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 332 (Wash. 1984) (holding that property
acquired by intimate partners during their nomarital relationship should be divided
equitably between them), and Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 837 (Wash. 1995)
(extending Lindsey to hold that courts should presume that property acquired by un-
married partners during the cohabitation period should, like community property
acquired during marriage, be presumed to be jointly owned by the couple).
9 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
10 A thoughtful piece along these lines is Kay & Amyx, supra note 4.
11 See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 328-34 (1982); Gregg Temple, Freedom of Contract
and Intimate Relationships, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 139-53 (1985).
12 See LENOREJ. WErrZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CoNTRACT (1981).
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tion,13 family law scholars were welcoming contract as the way to shed
what was seen as family law's quaint, stultifying, and gender-bound
reliance on concepts of status.
14
There were, however, a few voices dissenting from this triumph of
contract over status,15 and I believe time has vindicated them. The
lesson learned from the legacy of Marvin is that contract is a poor
model for intimate relations. Old-fashioned status rules, updated as
needed -to shed gender-role rigidities, are far better. That is the cen-
tral point of this brief Essay.
I.
The main defect with contract as the conceptual underpinning
for claims between intimate partners is that couples do not in fact
think of their relationship in contract terms.' 6 Perhaps the most obvi-
ous symptom of this defect is that decades of urging by contract en-
thusiasts have led few couples (married or unmarried) to make
express contracts at all, much less comprehensive contracts intended
to capture what their relationship is all about.17 The paucity of ex-
13 See GRANT Gn. ioR, THE DEATH OF CONT'RACr 65-85 (1974).
14 Seesupranote 11.
15 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 3, at 1159-70; Ruth L Deech, The Case Against
Legal Recognition of Cohabitation, 29 INTL & CONP. LQ. 480,494-97 (1980). I was also
an early skeptic. See my discussion of contract in Ira Mark Ellman, The Theiy of
Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1, 13-40 (1989).
16 I will return to and amplify this point, see infta Part H, but I wish first to explore
why it matters.
17 Real data on the frequency of contracting are scarce, but the basic claim is not
in serious dispute. Certainly written agreements between cohabitants are rare among
the reported cases, and while express oral agreements are easier to allege, the claim is
usually disputed and generally rejected. See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr.
2d 892, 898-900 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that an implied agreement was not sup-
ported by the evidence). The thoughtful observer might nonetheless suggest that
couples with express agreements might still be a large portion of all unmarried
couples, even if they are uncommon among reported cases, because the very fact of
their express agreement makes litigation between them less likely. Those working in
this area on a day-to-day basis suggest othenvise, however. For example, Frederick
Hertz, an attorney in the San Francisco Bay Area whose practice focuses on unmar-
ried couples, both gay and heterosexual, told me that in his experience the propor-
tion of such couples who enter written agreements is "miniscule." Interview with
Frederick Hertz, Of Counsel, Margolin & Biatch, in Berkeley, Cal. (Mar. 13, 2001).
He also observed that a larger proportion seek advice on written agreements at some
point and may even hire an attorney to draft one, but in the end they do not execute
it. Id. For more on Hertz's practice, see Fredrick Hertz, Legalize YourPlationshp with
Prid at http://wvv.samesexlaw.com/index.html (last modified Feb. 9, 2001).
More common, although still a small minority, are agreements between intimate
partners that have a more narrow scope. Premarital agreements meant to limit or
2001] 367
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press contracts for intimate relationships leads directly to the defect's
more serious legal consequence: courts have no sensible rule to apply
in dealing with end-of-relationship disputes between the typical un-
married partners who have no express agreement. Some courts hold
that in the absence of an express agreement there can be no claim at
all,'8 but more seem to follow Marvin and ask whether an agreement
between parties can be implied from their conduct.19 The difference
between these two approaches may be more apparent than real, how-
ever. If couples do not in fact think of their relationship in contract
terms, then a doctrine that directs courts to decide their disputes by
looking for a contract is unlikely to find one. This should lead the
observer to question whether the inquiry is misdirected from the start.
Do we want courts to think broadly about the rules that yield a fair
dissolution of an unmarried couple's relationship, or do we want to
limit courts to searching the parties' conduct for evidence that at
some point in the past they agreed upon terms that should now gov-
ern their mutual obligations?
The contract inquiry is obviously the more narrow one, for con-
tract focuses on one particular aspect of fairness, keeping one's
promises. The very idea of contract is to bind parties now to terms
that they agreed upon earlier, to require the later self to remain true
to the earlier self's commitments. Our willingness to allow persons to
avoid some of the legal consequences of marriage are familiar, and in recent years,
unmarried couples have similarly entered, on occasion, "anti-Marvin" agreements.
See, for example, the agreement in Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141 (Mass. 1998). A
contract with the focused purpose of avoiding particular consequences that the law
might otherwise attach to the parties' relationship is a very different item, however,
than the kind of agreement envisioned by Marvin and those who welcomed its com-
ing. Under the Marvin rubric, the contract is the sole source of any obligations be-
tween the partners, not a limit upon obligations the law may otherwise treat as arising
from the relationship.
18 Moronev. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980), is the leading example of
a court requiring express agreements but otherwise following Marvin. See also Tapley
v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218, 1219 (N.H. 1982) (refusing to recognize implied contracts
for homemaker services). Some legislatures responded to Marvin by requiring writ-
ten agreements for claims between unmarried partners, which are more restrictive,
since Morone accepts express oral agreements. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 513.075-.076 (West 1990); Tm. Bus. & Co i. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b) (3) (Vernon
1987). But other states rejected similar legislative proposals. See Carol S. Bruch,
Nonmarital Cohabitation in the Common Law Countries: A Study in Judicial-Legislative Inter-
action, 29 Am. J. Comp. L. 217, 226-27 (1981).
19 Cases in which courts followed the broader Marvin approach include Glasgo v,
Glasgo, 410 N.E.2d 1325, 1331-32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing recovery on express
or implied contract); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430, 435-38 (IV. Va. 1990) (same);
and Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Wis. 1987) (same).
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bind themselves in this way depends in important part on our assump-
tion that individuals have the capacity to determine for themselves
whether it is in their interest to make such a commitment about their
future conduct. With respect to individuals for whom we doubt that
factual assumption, such as children, contractual promises are not
binding 0 Yet, there is considerable social science evidence that per-
fectly competent adults lack the capacity to e-aluate rationally the
contractual commitments involved in an agreement about the conse-
quences that should flow from the dissolution of their intimate rela-
tionships-a dissolution which they do not expect to occur and which
may well occur, if it does occur, many years in the future when their
lives are dramatically different.2 1 Relationships develop over time in
ways that competent adults Will often fail to anticipate and that may
change their lives fundamentally. These considerations were impor-
tant to the recommendations in the American Law Institute's recently
promulgated Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution that courts con-
sider whether injustice will result from the enforcement of a premari-
tal agreement when it was made years before its enforcement is sought
or before the contracting parties had children together.2 The Insti-
tute's position, in fact, reflects the treatment of premarital agreements
by many American courts.
23
If such concerns over the ability of spouses to foresee the long-
term consequences of premarital agreement require limits on their
enforceability, then surely those same concerns also cast doubt on any
rule that would decide claims between unmarried partners by refer-
ence to express contracts they made years earlier. Even more doubt-
ful would be a rule directing the court, if there is no express contract,
to decide the claim by attempting to plumb the intentions that the
parties may have brought to the relationship years before their cur-
rent dispute arose. Contracts bind parties forever to the terms they
agreed upon at execution, and this static conception of obligation is
unsuited to the realities of intimate relationships.2 4
20 See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 14 (1979).
21 See in particular Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition md the Limits of
Contrac 47 STAN. L. REv. 211, 254-58 (1995).
22 See PRNCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUION: ANALISL AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 7.05 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [herinafter ALI P cN'PLES (Tentative Draft
No. 4)]. The Family Dissolution Principles were approved for final publication by the
Institute at its annual meeting in 2000, and publication of tie final version is ex-
pected in 2001.
23 See id. § 7.05 Reporter's Notes.
24 Some have argued that this is an oversimplified idea of contract and that inti-
mate relationships can be understood as "relational contracts," rel)ing upon a litera-
ture on that topic. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L Crafton, Maniage and
20011 1369
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One need only look at some of the cases to see how far a contract
rubric takes one from results that sensibly and fairly coordinate with
actual human behavior. Friedman v. Friedman,25 a California case, was
decided nearly twenty years after Marvin, but involved a couple (Terri
and Elliott) who began living together in 1967, before Marvin had
been decided.26 Children of the 1960s, they did not believe official
marriage necessary for the lifetime commitment they intended and so
vowed to be "partners in all respects 'without any sanction by the
State." 27 They purchased property in Alaska as "Husband and Wife,"
had two children together, and in the late 1970s moved to Berkeley
where Elliott attended law school and prospered economically.28
By 1982, their attitude about relationships had perhaps changed,
because they made plans to marry.29 Yet when bad weather kept Elli-
ott from returning from a business trip in time for the wedding, it was
never rescheduled, 30 suggesting perhaps that the interest in marriage
was not entirely mutual. By the mid-1980s, Terri, who had performed
the classic homemaking role throughout their relationship, became
Opportunism, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 881-83 (1994). The most ambitious effort of this
kind is probably Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84
VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998). But while the concept of relational contracting may be of
assistance to an economist or sociologist seeking to understand the behavior of par-
ties in long-term relationships, it provides little or no assistance to courts asked to
decide real cases framed as contract disputes. Either the parties had an agreement
that governs their particular dispute, or they did not, and the literature of relational
contracting does not offer courts much assistance in deciding this question. Those
who deal with one another repeatedly in commercial transactions may surely make
adjustments in response to changing circumstances in order to preserve a commercial
relationship they both find beneficial. But this observation cannot offer any help in
formulating new or different rules of contract law by which to govern their disputes, if
they have them. If one of the parties ceases to see the relationship as sufficiently
beneficial to warrant further adjustments and decides instead to take his or her busi-
ness elsewhere, the relational contract literature cannotjustify reliance on any new or
special contract principle by which to give the other party a claim for breach. This
point is well-made by a leading contracts scholar in Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational
Contracts, in GOOD FArm AND FAULT IN CoNnacr LAW 291, 296-98 (Jack Beatson &
Daniel Friedman eds., 1995), and in Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There is no Law of Rela-
tional Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 818-21 (2000). I have made these points
before. See Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Vio-
lence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 719, 745-47.
25 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct. App. 1993).
26 See id. at 894.
27 I.
28 See i. at 894-95.
29 See id. at 895.
30 1.1
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disabled with serious back problems.31 Their relationship apparently
deteriorated with her back, and in 1992, Terri filed a legal complaint
seeking equitable relief, including support.32 The trial court found
the parties had an "implied contract" providing that if they separated
Elliott would support Terri in the same manner as if they had married
and, accordingly, ordered temporary support pending final determi-
nation of Terui's claim.3 3 The couple had no express agreement de-
fining the obligations they would have to one another at their
relationship's end, and the appeals court, plausibly enough, held the
evidence of implied agreement also insufficient to sustain tie trial
court's order.34 Indeed, the parties' decision to live together "ithout
any sanction by the State" was inconsistent, the court concluded, with
Terni's claim that they agreed to be bound by the support rules appli-
cable to marriage. 35 As Elliot said of Terri's claim for post-relation-
ship support: "That was not part of our life. It was not part of what we
were doing.... [W]hen we split up, we split up."36
Even those most sympathetic to Terri's claims must concede that
Elliot's understanding of the couple's arrangement, at the time they
decided to live together, was entirely plausible. Young persons in
their twenties, with no children, few responsibilities, and many pros-
pects in front of them, may see little reason to bind themselves to
lifetime obligations that could outlast their mutual affection. But for
Terri, 1967 is then; 1992 is now. Much of a lifetime has passed.
Should the law really say that after twenty-five years together raising
two children, Elliott can leave their relationship lucratively employed
and with no obligations at all to Terri, who has become disabled, be-
cause she cannot show that at some earlier time he had entered into a
contract agreeing to them? Some might argue that the problem is
that the court is looking for the wrong contract. It need not find an
agreement about post-relationship obligations; it need only find an
agreement to have the relationship itself, an agreement it could then
conclude that Elliot has breached, leaving him liable for support. But
that analysis is no better, for it is hardly certain that Elliot is in breach
of any such agreement. Maybe, after all, they agreed to stay with one
another only so long as love endured, and neither of them is in
breach. Or maybe Elliott can argue that some aspect of Terri's recent
conduct violates their 1967 understanding, putting her in breach,
31 See iL
32 See id. at 893-94.
33 See id. at 894.
34 See id at 896-99.
35 See id at 899.
36 Id. at 895.
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even if he is the one who wishes to leave. Can the 1992 court really
reconstruct the 1967 understanding or even, if one were claimed, a
revised 1977 version? As I said years ago in a different context:
Indeed, one might well argue that couples divorce precisely because
they discover, as specific issues arise after some years of marriage,
that in fact there never was a clear contract, that they do not have
the same understanding of their mutual commitment. Although
they had an agreement of sorts, it was at a level of great generality.
Mutual love, mutual support, mutual respect, are all commitments
newlyweds might readily agree they undertook, even though they
differ later in their understanding of the concrete consequences of
those commitments. A court would typically have no basis for decid-
ing which understanding was correct. The spouses' "agreement"
was simply too vague to provide a court with sufficient guidance to
determine whether it has been breached.
7
Sociologists tell us that, in the United States, long-term relation-
ships between unmarried cohabitants are not the norm; such persons
usually either split up or marry.38 But cases involving long-term co-
habitations do exist, and surely a doctrine intended to work justice at
the dissolution of cohabiting relationships ought to deal aptly with
them. The Marvin doctrine does not. There are other cases like Elli-
ott's and Terri's with similar results.5 9 There are also cases in which
the court responds to similar facts by stretching contract doctrine be-
yond recognition in order to justify a remedy,40 as the dissenting
judge urged in Friedman itself.41 Either response would seem to indi-
37 Ellman, supra note 15, at 20.
38 There are many studies replicating this finding. One is Wendy D. Manning &
Pamela J. Smock, Why Many? Race and Transition to Marriage Among Cohabilors, 32 DE.
MOGRAPHY 509, 512 (1995) (finding that 81% of heterosexual, cohabiting unions end
within four years, because the parties either marry or split up). For similar British
data, seeJohn Haskey & Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation: Some Demographic Statistics, 20
FAm. L. 442, 442-43 (1990).
39 Other cases involving long-term relationships for which the contract rubric
provided little basis for relief, despite compelling equitable claims, include Rissberger
v. Gorton, 597 P.2d 366, 370 (Or. Ct. App. 1979) (reversing a trial court finding of
intent to share equally a duplex and other personal property), and Featherston v. Stein.
hoff 575 N.W.2d 6, 10-11 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (involving an eight year relationship
that produced a child; reversing a trial court finding of implied contract of support).
40 See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 906-07 (N.J. 1979) (finding the
man bound by an express agreement to provide support for the woman when, in the
course of their relationship, he said he would provide for her for the rest of her life, if
she would return and live with him). For criticism of the contract logic of Koziowski,
see Ellman, supra note 15, at 21-23.
41 "The result reached by the majority may be, in the eyes of some, good law; it is
lousy justice." Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896 (Poche, J., dissenting).
[VOL- 76:51372
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cate a mismatch between the problem (what do people owe one an-
other when it is over?) and the doctrine these courts employ to deal
with it.
II.
Let me now return to examine further my central premise, that
people do not think of their intimate relationships in contract terms.
We surely do think of successful marriages and marriage-like relation-
ships as reciprocal, which can easily seem like "contractual." But con-
tract involves more than reciprocity; it involves a bargained-for
exchange. 42 The difference is central. There is reciprocity when I
pick up the tab at lunch with a friend. Perhaps he paid last time, or
perhaps we have spent lunch discussing my plans for my son. Either
way, I want to pay down my social debt. There is a bargained-for ex-
change, on the other hand, as between my friend and I and the res-
taurant. When we ordered, we made a deal: if you bring us
hamburgers, we will pay you the price shown on the menu. This deal
is a discrete item, which is not to say that repeat customers cannot
develop fuller relationships with their vendor I might be more likely
to tolerate one day's badly charred burger, and the restauranteur
more likely to react civilly when I ask to pay tomorrow. But none of
this changes our understanding about the bill for lunch. When I pay,
I satisfy a legal debt, not a social one. Commercial actors can ex-
change all the civilities in the world, and may even be friends in other
contexts, but business is business.
Now, the confusion in the law arises from the fact that while mar-
riages (and domestic partnerships) are quite obviously more like
friendships than hamburgers, they also give rise to legally enforceable
obligations, which lead some people to forget the obvious and think
they are like hamburgers after all. The error apparently arises from
the mistaken assumption that the legal obligations arising from mar-
riage must have their source in a bargained-for exchange. The mis-
take is probably facilitated by the fact that the reciprocal nature of a
successful marriage gives it a superficial resemblance to a bargained-
for exchange, which is, after all, the source of so many legal obliga-
tions. But we must remain clear about the difference. Lunch with my
friend may leave me with a sense of social debt that is real, but non-
42 As the Restatment of Contracts explains, "the typical contract is a bargain" and
"the two essential elements of a bargain [are] agreement and exchange." RxsrirTE-
Nmsir (SacoND) OF CoNTRACTS § 17, cmt. b (1979). Wile some contracts are not
bargains, such as a promise made under seal to make a gift, they are atypical, subject
to special rules, and not relevant to the question considered here. See id. § 3, cmL e.
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specific. My opportunities to reciprocate may vary from paying for
lunch to helping my friend's brother prepare for ajob interview, and
for each of us gauging what is appropriate to offer or expect is an
important social skill. Our debt to the restaurant is not so open-tex-
tured. Friendship involves communicating interest in and concern
for one another's welfare over a longer time horizon; opportunities to
reciprocate may not present themselves in a convenient sequence for
turn-taking. The debt to the restaurant, by contrast, involves paying
$23.37- now.
So contractual obligations are well-defined in both time and na-
ture, while the reciprocities expected in close social relationships are
not. Contractual obligations are discrete while social obligations are
embedded in a larger relationship on which they depend for their
existence and meaning. The strength of a friendship may be inversely
proportional to the extent to which either party feels a need to keep
careful tabs on favors extended or received. There is indeed some
recent data on marriages that make this very point. As the sociologist
Steven Nock has observed in interpreting that data, "[K]eeping the
mental books... is dangerous for a marriage."43 If lovers have bar-
gains, they are complex emotional bargains in which they themselves
may not easily identify the quids and quos. Sociologists have found
that even though wives almost always do much more of the house-
work, most wives believe this division of labor is fair.44 Not equal-
fair. How can wives believe this? Presumably because they see a mari-
tal relationship as a whole, not as a series of discrete transactions, and
believe that in this whole, both partners are contributing. They also
see marriage, as Nock observes, as existing over time, with a past and a
future, in which the balance sheet need not tally day by day.45 Hus-
bands undoubtedly make similar kinds of assessments. How else
could so many husbands who work long hours providing the lion's
share46 of the family's income simultaneously feel they gain so much
from their marriages? And of course if they feel that way, who is to
43 Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1971, 1981 (2000).
Nock gives a summary account of the data here; it is more fully presented, he tells us,
in a forthcoming piece. See id. at 1977 n.15.
44 Nock gathers these studies. See id. at 1977, 1981-84.
45 Id.
46 I use the phrase with intentional irony and whimsy. Many years ago, I had tie
good fortune to spend some time observing lions in the wild in several East Afican
game parks. I there learned what is apparently conventional wisdom among natural-
ists, that all the real hunting is done by the lioness. The lion is occasionally pressed
into service to roar loudly at a herd of surprised wildebeast, sending them running in
the direction of the hidden and waiting lioness. But whether she has such assistance
or not, it is the lioness who always makes the actual kill. Among lions, in other words,
[VOL- 76:51374
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gainsay them? Nock guesses, quite plausibly I believe, that most hus-
bands think it fair that they are expected to work for pay even if their
wives are not. 47
The point here is that the successful marriage, and by extension
the successful domestic partnership, is not based upon the parties'
compliance with any agreement explicit enough in its terms for the
law sensibly to treat it as a contract. The successful intimate relation-
ship is reciprocal, but not contractual. This intuition would seem to
lie behind the old rule, still seen in the cases, that services rendered in
the course of a nonmarital "meretricious" relationship are presumed
to have been provided gratuitously, and not With any expectation of
repayment. 48 On the one hand, this characterization often seems jar-
ring, because the relationship is reciprocal, and services are not
donated by one party to the other in isolation from assumptions that
the relationship will continue and is important in the lives of both
partners. On the other hand, because long-term intimate partners do
not in fact usually provide services for one another as part of a bar-
gained-for exchange, the presumption that services are rendered "gra-
tuitously" is probably correct as a matter of contract lav.
49 Mutual
gifting arising from mutual concern and affection is not the same as a
bargained-for exchange.
These points, of course, apply equally to married partners, which
tells us that the legal claims allowed between former spouses are not
based upon contract, but something else. What else? The legal duties
that arise when people's lives become entwined. Relationships are
themselves the source of legal duties, without the need for any assis-
tance from contract. This is not a new idea. Landlords and tenants,
employers and employees, neighbors, lawyers and clients, and doctors
and patients all incur legally enforceable duties to one another arising
from their relationships.50 They may have a contract which itself cre-
the lioness provides the lion's share of the family income. So much for the folk wis-
dor inherent in traditional metaphors.
47 Nock, supra note 43, at 1977.
48 A recent ekample is Featlwrston v. Steinhoff, 575 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Mid. Ct. App.
1997). See also Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) ("The major
difficulty with implying a contract from the rendition of services for one another by
persons living together is that it is not reasonable to infer an agreement to pay for the
services rendered when the relationship of the parties makes it natural that the ser-
vices were rendered gratuitously.").
49 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50 In making the decision whether a duty isjustified, courts have recognized the
existence of a relationship between the parties as a primary factor. Of course, it is
true that even in the briefest of encounters with relative strangers, the law imposes
upon each person an obligation to use due care. &e, e.g., Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
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Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 680 (Cal. 1974) (discussing the general principle that each
person owes a duty of due care to all those who are at foreseeable risk of his unreason-
ably harmful conduct); Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528, 530 (N.H. 1973) (noting the
general principles of tort law that ordinarily impose liability upon persons for injuries
caused by their failure to exercise reasonable care). When a more established rela-
tionship is involved, additional obligations may arise. These duties are not based
upon contract or agreement, but upon the relationship itself. For a sophisticated
philosophical examination of this process, see Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Re-
sponsibilities, 26 PHIL. & PUB. Arr. 189 (1997), and SAMUEL SCHEFELER, FAMIUCs, NA.
TIONS AND STRANGERS (Lindley Lecture 1994). For a sociological perspective on how
norms of relational responsibility develop over time between husband and wife, see
generally Nock, supra note 43, at 1975-80.
In the law, duties arise from relationships in a variety of contexts, including the
relationship of doctor and patient, employer and employee, shareholder and corpo-
rate officer, landlord and tenant, and business owner and patron. Some are imposed
by the common law, others by statute. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 66-67 (1986) (finding that employers have a duty to their employees to provide a
workplace that is free from discrimination and abuse); Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apart-
ment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (acknowledging die appropriateness
of imposing a duty on landlords to protect tenants from third-party criminal assaults
in some situations based on the significance of the relationship, and noting that while
the "landlord is no insurer of his tenants' safety. . . he certainly is no bystander");
Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 212-13 (Cal. 1993) (recognizing
that commercial landowners owe both tenants and patrons a general duty of care,
which has been held to include the obligation to take reasonable steps to secure com-
mon areas against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties); Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344 (Cal. 1976) (holding that when a therapist enters
into a doctor-patient relationship, "the therapist becomes sufficiently involved to as-
sume some responsibility for the safety, not only of the patient himself, but also of any
third person whom the doctor knows to be threatened by the patient"); Sharp v. W.H.
Moore; Inc., 796 P.2d 506, 509 (Idaho 1990) (imposing a duty in certain circum-
stances on a business owner to protect patrons from the foreseeable criminal conduct
of third parties); Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430
N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1988) (acknowledging that because there is a fiduciary rela-
tionship, corporate officers owe shareholders a duty of loyalty); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821 (N.J. 1981) (recognizing the duty of directors to exer-
cise the care of ordinarily prudent and diligent persons based on the fiduciary rela-
tionship between corporate officers and shareholders).
There are many examples of when courts have sought to impose obligations
based on the existence of some special relationship. SeeAbbott v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 512
F.2d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 1975) (imposing a duty on the ship's officers to search and
attempt a rescue of a crewman who had fallen overboard); Juarez v. Boy Scouts of
Am., Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12, 35-36 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that public policy fac-
tors, including the special relationship between a boy scout organization and its
scouts, support the imposition of a duty of care to have taken reasonable protective
measures to protect the children from the risk of sexual abuse by adult volunteers
involved in scouting programs); Yu v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 144 A.2d 56,
58 (Conn. 1958) (requiring a common carrier to take reasonable affirmative steps to
aid a passenger in danger); Iglesias v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Ind. Ct. App.
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ates obligations, and we may think of their mutual decision to enter
into the relationship as a kind of contract. But in all these cases, the
law may impose duties upon them which are based upon the relation-
ship itself, not upon any agreement between them.
And family law provides perhaps the oldest examples of legal du-
ties arising from relationships, whether as husband and wife, or parent
and child. These are relationships to which the law gives special atten-
tion; the terms husband, wif, parent, and child are status labels con-
ferred by the law, with legal consequence. In the case of parent and
child, the limited utility of contract conceptions as the foundation of
legal duty is obvious. But the noncontractual foundation of legal du-
ties between intimate partners is nearly as clear, I think, once one
gives it much thought.
Understanding that the law's recognition of legal obligations be-
tween husbands and wives is not based upon contract tells us that Mar-
vin's focus on contract with respect to nonmarital couples missed the
mark conceptually, which explains why it fails in cases like Teri's and
Elliott's.51 A sensible legal rule for deciding when legal duties arise
between unmarried cohabitants will not ask whether they had a con-
tract, but whether their nonmarital relationship shares with marriage
those qualities which lead us to impose legal duties as between hus-
bands and wives. What are those qualities? And how can law state an
administrable rule that captures them in the nonmarital context?
These are the important tasks confronting any court or legislature de-
vising a rule to govern nonmarital relationships. I believe a promising
approach to them is offered by the American Law Institute's recent
effort in the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.52 I cannot repeat
1982) (recognizing the duty of law enforcement officers to keep prisoners safe and
free from harm); Fazzolari v. Portland Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 734 P.2d 1326, 1337 (Or.
1987) ("It is a special duty arising from the relationship between educators and chil-
dren entrusted to their care apart from any general responsibility not unreasonably to
expose people to a foreseeable risk of harm.").
51 See Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 896-99 (Ct. App. 1993); we
also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
52 See ALI PipicipLr.s (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 22, §§ 6.01-.06. My en-
thusiasm for the Institute's approach will not surprise readers who know that I was
Chief Reporter for this Institute project and one of the two Reporters (the other was
Grace Blumberg, who did most of the work after the coauthored initial drafts) prima-
rily responsible for its chapter on domestic partners. The Institute's anal)sis of when
former spouses incur continuing legal duties to one another is contained primarily in
Sections 5.02 through 5.05, while the key section with respect to unmarried partners
is 6.03. (These are the section numbers that will be employed in the final published
version, which is expected to appear in print before the end of 2001, although the
numbering of sections 5.02 and 6.03 remain unchanged). As of this date, the most
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the Institute's entire analysis in this brief Essay. But it would perhaps
be useful to describe the Institute's approach toward identifying those
nonmarital relationships which bear a sufficient resemblance to mar-
riage to justify and require similar, post-relationship legal obligations
between the parties whom the Institute calls "domestic partners." 3
Section 6.03 defines domestic partners as "two persons of the
same or opposite sex, not married to one another, who for a signifi-
cant period of time share a primary residence and a life together as a
couple."5 4 A key phrase in this definition is "share... a life together
as a couple." The same section lists circumstances that bear on decid-
ing whether any particular unmarried couple falls within this class.55
The list includes many of the typical practicalities of sharing lives,
such as the extent to which the parties commingled their finances, but
it also includes considerations of another kind, such as the extent to
which the parties themselves treated their relationship "as qualitatively
distinct from the relationship either party had with any other per-
son,"56 and other circumstances that perhaps combine these two, such
as whether the relationship "wrought change in the life of either or
both parties. '57 Another factor that this section includes among those
supporting the conclusion that the parties "share a life together as a
couple" is the "physical intimacy" of the parties' relationship.58
Surely, physical intimacy is psychologically and socially one central
fact distinguishing true couples whose relationship should trigger con-
tinuing legal obligations from friends whose relationship should not.
Yet Marvin had great difficulty with this simple but central point, for
its very treatment of true couples under the contract rubric risks liken-
ing them to coupling that is commercial. So the Marvin court appar-
ently felt constrained to caution that, of course, any sex must be
severed from the enforceable part of the contract, that no recovery
can be had for any portion of the agreement that "rests upon" illicit
sexual services.59 Yet, one might ask, what kind of relationships did
the Marvin court have in mind? Must the Marvin petitioner show that
recent published version of section 6.03 is contained in Tentative Draft No. 4 (April
2000), while the sections from Chapter 5 can be found in the PRINCPLES OF TlE LXW
OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 5.02-.05 (Proposed Final
Draft, Pt. 1, 1997). The project received final approval at the Institute's May 2000
annual meeting.
53 ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 22, § 6.03(7).
54 Id
55 See i.
56 Id § 6.03(7) (g).
57 Id. § 6.03(7)(e).
58 Id. § 6.03(7) (h).
59 See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976).
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the couple's sexual relationship had no important meaning to them,
that they could just as easily have been celibate without any impact
upon the give and take in the rest of their relationship? If so, then
one would expect the case to apply to precious few couples.60
Quite clearly, some of the considerations listed in section 6.03
could present a factfinding challenge, and so, for ease of administra-
tion, the section goes on to provide that persons who have a child
together and share a common household for a certain minimum pe-
riod of time are domestic partners. 61 Even if they have no common
child, persons who share a common household for a long enough pe-
riod62 are treated as domestic partners unless one of them shows that
they did not share a life together as a couple. When a couple lives
together long enough, in their own primary residence, and certainly
when they combine that with having children together, it is reasona-
ble to assume they have a relationship of a kind that gives rise to mu-
tual obligations of which the law should take cognizance. Perhaps
contract could have a role for couples who wish to avoid that legal
conclusion, just as the law allows married couples to ary, by contract,
some of the consequences of their marital status. 63 But contract is not
the basis of their legal obligations to one another.
m.
Twenty-five years later, Marvin thus seems dated, the harbinger of
a revolution that never took place. To be sure, there has been a large
60 A far more sensible approach to this problem was taken by the Oregon Su-
preme Court in Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144 (Or. 1976), when it held that it would
enforce agreements so long as sexual services were not the "primary consideration!-
so long as the agreement "contemplated all the burdens and amenities of married
life." Rd. at 147. But note that in requiring a contract of such broad scope, the court
moved toward a requirement quite similar to the Institute's, for it might seem a claim
would arise under this doctrine whenever the parties stayed together for a while in a
relationship which was regarded by them as the equivalent of marriage. Terri and
Elliott, for example, would seem to have fallen within the ambit of this test. In fact,
Oregon courts were later more explicit in abandoning exclusive reliance upon con-
tract ideas, concluding that while the parties' intent is iniportant, the court is "not
precluded from exercising [its] equitable powers to reach a fair result based on the
circumstances of each case." Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. CL App.
1993).
61 The Institute suggests two years as the minimum period of time. &eAll Ppnn-
cIwLEs (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 22, §6.03 cmt. d, at 23.
62 The Institute suggests three years. Id
63 Chapter 7 of the ALI Prindples, which governs the enforceability of premarital
agreements, in fact applies as well, by its terms, to agreements between domestic part-
ners that would -ary the Principes' application to them. SreALI PuNcuPLEs (Tentative
Draft No. 4), supra note 22, § 7.01(2) (a).
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increase in the number of unmarried, cohabiting couples.64 But that
was the revolution Marvin was responding to, not the revolution that
some thought it would engender. If one takes a global perspective,
the ALI's approach to handling nonmarital relationships appears to
be the trend, in locations as close as Canada and as far as Australia."
The trend has been pushed in important part by society's gradually
increasing acceptance of same-sex couples. The Marvin doctrine has
itself been applied to same-sex couples,66 to be sure, but the enforce-
ment of private agreements, while better than nothing, does not offer
the same symbolic recognition as the inclusion of same-sex couples
within a state-defined status classification such as "domestic partners."
And of course it is same-sex couples, for whom marriage is not availa-
ble, who are the most interested parties to this legal development.
Fuller recognition of same-sex couples of course involves not only the
availability of marriage-like rules as between the partners themselves,
when their relationship ends, but also the recognition of such couples
by third parties, such as employers and government, as equivalent to
married couples in connection with any of the myriad benefits that
flow from marital status. 67 This current arena of reform is, of course,
entirely beyond the scope of the contract question addressed by Mar-
vin, which thus has little to contribute to it.68 Marvin was perhaps a
necessary first step, but it surely was not the last.
64 See IRA MARK ELjmAN Er AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 929 (3d ed.
1998).
65 SeeALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 22, § 6.03 (citing various
authorities in the reporter's notes).
66 See, e.g., Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing
Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988)).
67 For a compendium of such third-party recognitions kept current, see Human
Rights Campaign, Domestic Parner Benefits, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/
dp/index.asp (last modified Apr. 30, 2001).
68 It was also beyond the scope of the ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4),
supra note 22, which dealt only with the rights of unmarried parties inter se, even
though the status classification which it adopted may lend itself more easily to wider
application.
